0 Personal identity through time

Recall these theories of identity through time for ordinary objects like books and statues
- Mereological Essentialism: No object can survive a change in parts (so ordinary objects do not persist).
- Endurantism (in 3D Theory package): Objects persist by being wholly located whenever they exist.
- Perdurantism (in 4D Theory package): Objects persist by having temporal parts that exist at different times.

Personal identity needs to be treated specially, even if we end up with parallel theories of personal identity through time
- \text{ME}_p: No person can survive a change in parts.
- \text{Endurantism}_p: Persons persist by being wholly located whenever they exist.
- \text{Perdurantism}_p: Persons persist by having temporal parts that exist at different times.

This is because in the case of persons, we appear to have more options for what sort of thing a person is. In particular, unlike books and statues, persons are thinking creatures.

The way we’re going to approach this debate is to talk about criteria for personal identity through time.

Desiderata for a theory of personal identity (Shoemaker 335)
1. Accounts for the special access we have (through memory) to our own experiences
2. Accounts for the special importance personal identity has for us over objectual identity
3. Coheres with the rest of what we know about the world

1 The memory criterion

Memory theory: A at t1 is the same person as B at t2 iff B remembers at t2 experiences of A at t1.
- This theory appears to account for the special access we have to our experiences
- Locke: “…should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince’s past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon deserted by his own sol, everyone sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince’s actions.”
Reid’s objection: Here is a counterexample to Memory Theory. As a boy, X is flogged for robbing an orchard. As a young officer, X wins a medal for bravery; he remembers the flogging. As an elderly general, X remembers winning the medal, but does not remember the flogging. But then the boy is identical to the officer and the officer is identical to the general, but the boy is not identical to the general.

(Definition) A at t1 and B at t2 are memory connected iff B has a memory at t2 that is appropriately causally dependent upon a memory A has at t1.

Revised Memory Theory: A at t1 is the same person as B at t2 iff there is a series of person stages from A to B such that each stage is memory-connected with the preceding member.

Butler’s objection: “Remembering” presupposes identity, so the account is circular.

- Person S remembers event E iff (1) S has an apparent memory of E, (2) the content of the apparent memory ‘matches’ E, and (3) S was appropriately related to E at the time of its occurrence.
- Hypnotist case leads to revision: (3’) S’s apparent memory was caused in an appropriate way by his (someone’s) experiencing E at the time of its occurrence.
- Shoemaker: If the notion of a “causal chain of an appropriate sort” from S’s apparent memory to E can be used without invoking personal identity, then circularity is avoided.
  - “Of an appropriate sort” does not need to be characterized using personal identity. (Fission cases)
  - Memory “from the inside” does not require personal identity either.

Final objection: Possibility of amnesia

2 The psychological criterion

Consider these psychological traits: personality, character, tastes, interests, etc.

(Definition) A at t1 and B at t2 are psychologically connected iff B has a psychological trait at t2 that is appropriately causally dependent upon a psychological trait A has at t1.

Psychological Criterion: A at t1 is the same person as B at t2 iff there is a series of person stages from A to B such that each stage is psychologically connected with the preceding member (and there is no branching).